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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
 
No. 16-4195 
________________ 
 
LIBERTY WOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
        
           Appellant  
 
v. 
 
THE MOTOR VESSEL OCEAN QUARTZ,  
Her engines, tackle, appurtenances, etc., in rem;  
DALIA SHIP HOLDINGS SA, in personam 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. C. Civil Action No. 1-15-cv-08843) 
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
________________ 
 
Argued on July 11, 2017 
 
Before:  MCKEE, AMBRO and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 4, 2018) 
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Richard Q. Whelan, Esq.  (ARGUED) 
Palmer, Biezup & Henderson 
190 North Independence Mall West 
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Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
  Counsel for Appellees 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
Liberty Woods International (LWI) brought suit for 
cargo damage sustained during a trip to Camden, New Jersey, 
on the Ocean Quartz (Vessel).  Liability for the damage is 
governed by the carrier’s bill of lading, which contains a 
forum selection clause requiring suit to be brought in South 
Korea.  LWI instead sought to bring an in rem suit against the 
Vessel in the District of New Jersey, arguing that the foreign 
forum selection clause violates the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act (COGSA) because South Korea does not allow in rem 
3 
 
suits.  The District Court dismissed the case, and for the 
following reasons, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
LWI purchased plywood veneer sheets, which it 
shipped to Camden, New Jersey, on the Vessel.  Dalia Ship 
Holding owns the Vessel; however, in a chain of chartering, 
Dalia bareboat chartered1 the Vessel to Star Bulk, which in 
turn time chartered it to Daiichi, which in turn time chartered 
it to SK Shipping.  SK Shipping issued a bill of lading which 
specified that “[a]ny claim, dispute, suit or action concerning 
goods carried under this Bill of Lading, whether based upon 
breach of contract, tort, or otherwise shall be brought before 
the Seoul District Court in Korea.”  Both parties agree that 
LWI’s cargo is covered by this bill of lading.   
 
In February 2013, the Vessel arrived in Camden, and 
LWI discovered that its cargo was damaged.  Believing the 
damage was caused by improper stowage, LWI threatened to 
arrest the Vessel.  In lieu of an arrest, the Japan Ship Owners’ 
Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association (JSO) issued to 
LWI and its insurers a letter of undertaking (LOU) on behalf 
of the Vessel, which could be used to satisfy any judgment 
against the Vessel in rem up to and including $2.75 million.   
 
On December 23, 2015, LWI filed suit in the District 
of New Jersey against the Vessel in rem and Dalia in 
personam.  Dalia answered on behalf of the in rem defendant.  
                                              
1 Bareboat chartering transfers complete control and operation 
of the vessel from the owner to the bareboat charterer without 
imposing liability for the acts of the charterer.   
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LWI later learned that it could not recover in personam 
against Dalia because of the bareboat charter.  While LWI 
could have filed an in personam suit against S.K. Shipping in 
South Korea, it chose not to.  At argument, counsel admitted 
that this was a strategic move on its part, because LWI felt 
that its suit would not be successful in South Korea.   
 
The Vessel moved to dismiss the New Jersey suit 
based on the forum selection clause in the bill of lading.  LWI 
argued that enforcing the forum selection clause would 
violate section 3(8) of COGSA.  In relevant part, this section 
states:  
 
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a 
contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the 
ship from liability for loss or damage to or in 
connection with the goods, arising from 
negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and 
obligations provided in this section, or lessening 
such liability otherwise than as provided in this 
Act, shall be null and void and of no effect.  A 
benefit of insurance in favor of the carrier, or 
similar clause, shall be deemed to be a clause 
relieving the carrier from liability.2 
LWI argued that this provision invalidates the foreign forum 
selection clause because South Korea does not recognize in 
rem suits.  On November 9, 2016, the District Court granted 
the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3).  LWI appealed.   
                                              
2 Note to 46 U.S.C. § 30701, Title I, Section 8 (emphasis 
added).  
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II.3 
A. 
In granting the motion to dismiss, the District Court 
erred in interpreting COGSA by confusing it with the Harter 
Act, a precursor to COGSA.  COGSA was modeled after the 
Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to Bills of Lading (Hague Rules).4  In 2006, COGSA 
was relocated from 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300 et seq., to a note after 
46 U.S.C. § 30701.5  During this same period, the Harter Act 
was also moved from 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 to 46 U.S.C. 
§§ 30701-30707.  As a result, COGSA was amended, not 
merely relocated.  The relocated Harter Act provisions were 
the “amended” COGSA provisions.  Upon analyzing 46 
U.S.C. §§ 30704 and 30705, the District Court held that 
Congress modified COGSA’s language so that it no longer 
                                              
3 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1332(a)(2) and1333(1), and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s construction of COGSA, see e.g., United States v. 
Cooper, 396 F.3d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted), 
and review the District Court’s decision to dismiss a 
complaint on the basis of forum non conveniens for abuse of 
discretion, Windt v. Qwest Comms Int’l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 
189 (3d Cir. 2008) (“This Court reviews a district court’s 
dismissal of a complaint on forum non conveniens grounds 
for abuse of discretion.” (citations omitted)). 
4 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 
U.S. 528, 536 (1995). 
5 200 A.L.R. Fed. 249 (2005) (noting the original locations 
for COGSA and the Harter Act). 
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prohibited limiting a ship’s liability.6  That, however, was a 
misinterpretation of COGSA.  
 
B. 
Nevertheless, we will affirm the judgment because the 
foreign forum selection clause here does not violate COGSA.   
 
While foreign forum selection clauses were originally 
disfavored under COGSA, the Supreme Court later adopted a 
policy that better reflected the need to respect the competence 
of foreign forums to resolve disputes.  In the seminal case of 
Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, the Second Circuit held a 
foreign forum selection clause to be invalid because it “put[] 
‘a high hurdle’ in the way of enforcing liability, and thus 
[was] an effective means for carriers to secure settlements 
lower than if cargo [owners] could sue in a convenient 
forum.”7  After Indussa, courts of appeal uniformly adopted 
this reasoning to invalidate foreign forum selection clauses8 
until the Supreme Court overruled Indussa in Vimar Seguros 
y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer.   
 
                                              
6 App. 14 (“Therefore, it is evident from the plain language of 
COGSA that ‘the carrier’ may not limit its liability through 
provisions inserted into a bill of lading.  46 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 30704, 30705.  Congress did not make the same 
requirement of ‘the ship.’”).   
7 377 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1967) (internal citation omitted). 
8 Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 533 (collecting cases).   
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Sky Reefer held that a foreign arbitration9 clause would 
not lessen carrier liability in violation of COGSA solely 
because litigating abroad would be more costly.10  While 
acknowledging that a choice of forum and choice of law 
clause would be invalid as against public policy if they 
operated as a “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue 
statutory remedies,”11 the Court noted that “the historical 
judicial resistance to foreign forum selection clauses has little 
place in an era when . . . businesses . . . now operate in world 
markets.”12  Moreover, the Court stated that it would be “out 
of keeping with the objects of the [Hague Rules] for the 
courts of this country to interpret COGSA to disparage the 
authority or competence of international forums for dispute 
resolution.”13  Accordingly, the Court held that while 
COGSA prohibited lessening the “liability for loss or damage 
. . . arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and 
obligations provided in this section,” 14 COGSA did not 
address the “means and costs of enforcing that liability.”15  
“The relevant question . . . is whether the substantive law to 
                                              
9 While Sky Reefer involved a foreign arbitration clause, the 
Supreme Court noted that “foreign arbitration clauses are but 
a subset of foreign forum selection clauses in general[.]”  Id. 
at 534 (citation omitted).  
10 Id.  
11 Id. at 540 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
12 Id. at 537-38 (first omission in original) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
13 Id. at 537. 
14 Id. at 534 (omission in original). 
15  Id. 
8 
 
be applied will reduce the carrier’s obligations to the cargo 
owner below what COGSA guarantees.”16   
 
LWI argues, however, that the forum selection clause 
here violates COGSA because in rem suits are themselves a 
substantive right guaranteed by the statute.  In the alternative, 
LWI seems to argue that mandating a South Korean forum 
will effectively limit the Vessel’s liability.  We consider each 
argument in turn. 
 
1. 
LWI claims that COGSA designates in rem suits as 
substantive rights, which are violated by the instant forum 
selection clause.  We disagree.  As LWI concedes, when the 
plain language of a statute is clear, the text should govern.17  
An examination of the plain language of section 3(8) shows 
that the clause clearly protects both carrier and ship liability; 
any clause completely eliminating or lessening ship liability 
runs afoul of COGSA.18  This does not mean, however, that 
section 3(8) guarantees the right to an in rem suit.  Rather, 
COGSA protects ship liability, not any particular vehicle for 
imposing it.  The text does not mention in rem suits, nor 
require any specific remedy for enforcing ship liability.  
Indeed, such an interpretation would run counter to Sky 
Reefer’s holding that COGSA does not protect procedural 
                                              
16 Id. at 539 (citation omitted). 
17 Cooper, 396 F.3d at 310 (citation omitted). 
18 Note to 46 U.S.C. § 30701, Title I, Section 3(8) 
(prohibiting “[a]ny clause, covenant, or agreement in a 
contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from 
liability[.]”). 
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means for enforcing liability.  Insofar as prohibiting in rem 
suits makes enforcing ship liability more costly or less 
convenient, Sky Reefer explicitly held that liability is not 
improperly lessened by procedural costs.19   
 
While LWI acknowledges that section 3(8) protects 
against lessening of ship liability, it cites this language as 
establishing a substantive right to in rem suits without 
adequately explaining this analytic leap.  LWI argues in its 
brief that in rem suits are well established and important 
features of maritime law in the United States.  It maintains 
that nothing in section 3 excludes in rem rights or limits in 
rem rights against the ship to a procedural device for the 
enforcement of an in personam defendant’s liability.  This 
argument turns the necessary discussion on its head; arguing 
that absence of express limitations grants a substantive right, 
especially in light of Sky Reefer’s limitations, is woefully 
inadequate.   
 
In addition to the textual reasons for concluding that 
COGSA does not grant the substantive right to in rem suits, 
there are strong policy considerations that caution against 
such an interpretation.  Requiring in rem suits would 
essentially invalidate numerous foreign forum selection 
clauses, as many countries do not acknowledge in rem suits.20  
                                              
19 Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 534 (noting the difference “between 
applicable liability principles and the forum in which they are 
to be vindicated”). 
20 See, e.g., Thyssenkrupp Materials NA, Inc. v. M/V KACEY, 
236 F. Supp. 3d 835, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (acknowledging 
that Greek law does not recognize in rem actions); Uniwire 
Trading LLC v. M/V Wladyslaw Orkan, 622 F. Supp. 2d 15, 
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Indeed, the United States is one of the few countries that do 
recognize in rem suits.  Imposing this idiosyncratic 
procedural requirement on other countries would be 
needlessly parochial.  For these reasons, we conclude that 
COGSA section 3(8)’s substantive protections21 encompass 
ship liability, not in rem suits specifically as the instrument to 
seek that recovery.22 
                                                                                                     
21 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (acknowledging that Polish law does not 
recognize in rem suits); Matter of Topgallant Lines, Inc., 154 
B.R. 368, 380 (S.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d sub nom. McAllister 
Towing v. Ambassador, 20 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(acknowledging that German law does not recognize in rem 
suits).  
21 For this reason, and because LWI has not argued that any 
other statute creates a substantive right to in rem suits, we 
reject LWI’s argument that the forum selection clause 
functions as a prospective waiver of a statutory remedy, as 
prohibited by Sky Reefer.   
22 We join the Ninth Circuit in so holding.  The Ninth Circuit 
upheld a forum selection clause specifying that Korean law 
would govern in Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. M.V. DSR 
Atlantic, holding that an in rem proceeding was merely a 
“means . . . of enforcing [COGSA] liability.”  131 F.3d 1336, 
1339-40 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Mar. 10, 1998) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (omission in 
original).  The Ninth Circuit found no COGSA violation 
because the vessel presented uncontroverted evidence that 
Korean law was at least as favorable to the plaintiff as 
COGSA.  Id. at 1340.  The Ninth Circuit summarily 
confirmed this holding in Kukje Hwajae Ins. Co., Ltd. v. M/V/ 
Hyundai Liberty, 408 F.3d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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2. 
LWI argues that even if in rem suits are not a 
substantive right, the forum selection clause here effectively 
relieves or lessens ship liability by not recognizing in rem 
actions, in violation of COGSA.  Once again, we disagree. 
 
While in rem suits might appear to be an obvious way 
to impose ship liability, courts have recognized other avenues 
for imposing liability in situations where in rem suits are 
prohibited.  Courts have recognized plaintiffs’ ability to 
obtain LOUs in lieu of bringing an in rem suit when they are 
precluded from doing so by arbitration clauses, which 
functionally prohibit in rem suits.23  For example, in Thyssen 
Inc. v. Calypso Shipping Corporation, S.A., the Second 
Circuit held that an arbitration clause did not violate COGSA 
because the plaintiff accepted an LOU as full security of its 
claims and could have recovered against the ship pursuant to 
the LOU.  The Second Circuit reasoned that “[a] letter of 
undertaking replaces the vessel as the res and moots the 
question of the need for separate in rem claim.”24  This 
Circuit similarly held that “[g]enerally, once a[n] LOU is 
issued, the letter becomes a complete substitute for the res 
and the maritime lien transfers from the vessel to the LOU.”25   
                                              
23 Petroleos Mexicanos Refinacion v. M/T KING A, 554 F.3d 
99, 108 (3d Cir. 2009) (“An in rem action is cognizable only 
in federal court; therefore the vessel could not have been a 
party to the in personam arbitration.” (citing Madruga v. 
Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560 (1954))). 
24 Thyssen, Inc. v. Calypso Shipping Corp., S.A., 310 F.3d 
102, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 
25 Petroleos, 554 F.3d at 104 (citations omitted). 
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As the Vessel argues, LWI could have obtained an 
LOU that would provide security for an in personam suit in 
South Korea.  Moreover, the Vessel produced an 
unchallenged affidavit by Korean lawyer Byung-Suk Chung, 
claiming that South Korean law allows a party to “obtain[] 
security from vessel interests by arresting a vessel or 
attaching other assets in a foreign jurisdiction . . . to act as 
security for an in personam judgment to be obtained in the 
Seoul District Court.”26  Because LWI would then be able to 
collect from the Vessel using the LOU, the forum selection 
clause would not lessen or relieve the ship’s liability in 
violation of COGSA.   
 
In response, LWI raises a narrow argument:  LWI 
concedes that obtaining an LOU is an accepted practice that is 
functionally equivalent to arresting a ship in an in rem suit.27  
Further, LWI does not argue that the forum selection clause 
prevented LWI from arresting the Vessel and obtaining a 
bond or an LOU.  Instead, LWI argues that the forum 
selection clause eliminated ship liability in this case, because 
LWI received an LOU that secured only an in rem judgment 
against the Vessel.  LWI does not allege that it could not have 
obtained an LOU unencumbered by this restriction.  Indeed, 
                                              
26 App. 119.   
27 LWI’s counsel admitted that the LOU is limited to the 
amount “you could get if you actually arrested the vessel.  So 
what you get in a letter of undertaking is exactly the same 
thing that you get when you arrest the vessel . . ..”  Audio 
Recording of Oral Arguments held July 11, 2017 at 5:50-
6:15, http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings.   
Additionally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Supplemental Rules allow for a similar procedure.   
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LWI’s inability to recover seems to be a consequence of its 
own deliberate inaction:  First, it refused to file an in 
personam suit against S.K. Shipping in South Korea.  Second, 
it did not obtain an LOU that would be applicable to an in 
personam suit.  LWI’s own willful limitation of alternatives, 
not the forum selection clause, has eliminated its ability to 
recover.  For this reason, we hold that the forum selection 
clause did not effectively lessen or eliminate the Vessel’s 
liability and that it is valid under COGSA. 
 
Because LWI has not raised any other arguments as to 
how the District Court abused its discretion in enforcing the 
forum selection clause, we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of the suit.   
 
IV. 
In this case, we are asked to support an interpretation 
of COGSA that would invalidate a host of foreign forum 
selection clauses for the sake of a procedural device available 
in few countries besides the United States.  Where parties 
have contracted to bring suit abroad, the U.S. must be 
cognizant of its status as a member of a global community 
and respect the competence of other jurisdictions to 
adjudicate claims.  In light of this and in light of the fact that 
the forum selection clause did not lessen or eliminate ship 
liability for cargo damage, we decline to impose LWI’s 
restrictive interpretation of COGSA.  COGSA does not 
invalidate the forum selection clause simply because the 
selected jurisdiction does not acknowledge in rem suits.  For 
this reason, we will affirm the District Court’s order, 
dismissing the action.   
1 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring  
For a maritime creditor an action in rem is a procedure 
for obtaining pre-judgment security and post-judgment 
enforcement.  In the global shipping business the debtor’s 
ship is typically the main asset on which a judgment-creditor 
can rely to collect from a defendant located perhaps on the 
other side of the world.  A court can easier locate, bring 
within its jurisdiction, and arrest the ship than a defendant’s 
other foreign assets.   
It is no surprise then that maritime law supplies in rem 
liability against a ship, that is, permits an action naming the 
ship as though it were the defendant.  As is relevant here, in 
the United States a ship can be liable in rem for cargo 
damage, the idea being that the ship impliedly ratified the 
shipping contract when the carrier loaded the cargo onboard. 
See Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Akili, 704 F.3d 77, 83 (2d 
Cir. 2012); see also Pioneer Import Corp. v. Lafcomo, 49 
F.Supp. 559, 561–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 138 F.2d 907 
(2d Cir. 1943) (“A lien against the ship arises for damage to 
cargo caused by improper storage.”).   
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, or COGSA, 
assumes the availability of an action against the ship.  Indeed, 
§ 3 of COGSA is titled, “Responsibilities and Liabilities of 
Carrier and Ship.” (emphasis added).  And under § 3(8), the 
parties to a contract for shipping goods by sea cannot agree to 
lessen or relieve the liability of the “carrier or the ship.”  
However, an action in rem is only one way to impose liability 
on a ship.  Although South Korean law does not allow in rem 
suits, Liberty Woods International concedes that equivalent 
security for in personam suits is available.  As it chose not to 
pursue this avenue for relief, I agree with my colleagues that 
any lessening of the ship’s liability is the fault of Liberty 
Woods, not the selection of a foreign forum.  
If, however, a forum-selection clause were to operate 
such that a shipper could never enforce the selected forum’s 
judgment against the value of the ship that carried the 
shipper’s damaged goods, the clause would be unenforceable 
per COGSA § 3(8). See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. 
M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995) (“[W]ere we 
persuaded that the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses 
operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right 
2 
 
to pursue statutory remedies, we would have little hesitation 
in condemning the agreement as against public policy.” 
(internal quotations and ellipsis omitted)).  My concern is 
that, in another case, the common shipping industry practice 
of chartering and sub-chartering a ship risks placing it and its 
owner beyond the reach of the designated forum’s in 
personam jurisdiction.  Here, because sub-charterer SK 
Shipping Co. Ltd. operated the Ocean Quartz, the parties 
agree that its owner, Dalia Ship Holding S.A., bears no 
liability for damage to Liberty Woods’ cargo.  This naturally 
leads to a question: if Dalia Ship Holding bears no liability, 
how could Liberty Woods attach Dalia Ship’s property—that 
is, the Ocean Quartz—to enforce a judgment against someone 
else (i.e., SK Shipping)?  
As noted, the parties do not contest that Liberty Woods 
could have enforced a judgment obtained in South Korea 
against the Ocean Quartz’s value.  So there is no reason to 
question that proposition here.  But I am not convinced it will 
hold in every case.  It is easy to imagine a shipowner 
contending that a personal judgment against a sub-charterer 
several steps removed should not be enforceable against the 
owner’s vessel.  The use of so-called “bareboat” or “demise” 
charter agreements, in which a shipowner surrenders control 
of the vessel to the charterer (and ultimately any sub-charterer 
down the line) and disclaims carrier liability, heightens the 
concern.  An owner can credibly “seek to use the bareboat 
charter as a shield against in personam liability.” Backhus v. 
Transit Cas. Co., 532 So. 2d 447, 449 (La. Ct. App. 
1988), aff'd, 549 So. 2d 283 (La. 1989).  If the sub-charterer 
has few assets or becomes insolvent, the shipper might be left 
high and dry without compensation for damage to its cargo.  
A suit in rem provides a means of cutting through a 
web of sub-charter agreements to impose liability on the ship 
directly and vindicate § 3(8)’s command (and thereby protect 
shippers in the face of judgment-proof sub-charterers).  Other 
jurisdictions may provide other procedural vehicles to deliver 
these protections (as apparently South Korea does).  In my 
view, COGSA requires that a shipper have some means to 
assess liability for damaged goods against the value of the 
ship.  Because Liberty Woods has not explained why it would 
be impossible to vindicate its rights in the designated forum, I 
agree with my colleagues that we must affirm the dismissal of 
its in rem action.  
